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All statements

LlamaRisk stated that USDT, USDC, USDT0, POL, WAVAX, sAVAX, XAUt, PAXG and OP, including their bridged and wrapped versions, stay at LTV 0 on Aave V3 and at a collateral factor of 0 on Aave V4, identifying these as the assets held across the exploiter’s address cluster.

This line is our short summary of the quote below. The quote is the evidence.

ReportedattributionStatement 1013

USDT, USDC, USDT0, POL, WAVAX, sAVAX, XAUt, PAXG and OP, including their bridged and wrapped versions, stay at LTV 0 on Aave V3 and at a collateral factor of 0 on Aave V4, on every market where they are listed. On Aave V3 this also applies to E-Mode. These are the assets held across the exploiter’s address cluster .

Speaker
LlamaRisk
Publisher
Aave governance forum (Other)
Original
Binance Hot Wallet Exploit: Aave's Response
Captured
Stored copy
sha256 0d443ca35e59
Event time

Other statements from the same source

ReportedresponseStatement 1006

LlamaRisk said in its post on Aave's response that markets would stay frozen until the exploiter's funds stopped moving and there was more clarity on containment from Binance.

The situation is still developing. We will keep monitoring the exploiter’s wallets and the affected price feeds and will share updates as they come. Markets will stay frozen until the exploiter’s funds stop moving and we get more clarity on the containment from Binance’s side. We will then work with Aave Labs and the other service providers on a staged unfreeze. A long freeze also affects utilisation. Frozen reserves take no new supply, so withdrawals by large suppliers raise utilisation and borrow rates, and only repayments pull them back down. We are watching utilisation on the frozen reserves, and will evaluate the order of the unfreeze.

Speaker
LlamaRisk
Publisher
Aave governance forum (Other)
Original
Binance Hot Wallet Exploit: Aave's Response
Captured
Stored copy
sha256 0d443ca35e59
ReportedfreezeStatement 1012

LlamaRisk stated that the second Risk Steward batch reduced borrow caps and draw caps on the largest borrow paths to about 2% above the amount borrowed just before the exploit, removing about $3.7B of unused borrow capacity on Aave V3 and $130M on Aave V4.

The second batch reduced borrow caps and draw caps on the largest borrow paths to about 2% above the amount borrowed just before the exploit. This removes about $3.7B of unused borrow capacity on Aave V3 and $130M on Aave V4, which would otherwise have become available all at once when markets reopen. Every reserve can still return to its pre-exploit borrow size. The GHO borrow cap reductions on Aave V3 Core and Prime were queued with the GHO Stewards.

Speaker
LlamaRisk
Publisher
Aave governance forum (Other)
Original
Binance Hot Wallet Exploit: Aave's Response
Captured
Stored copy
sha256 0d443ca35e59
Event time